In the Q & A section, I asked her about predestination in Thomas. Aquinas very clearly asserts a hard double predestination in the Summa. If you doubt me, just read this:
My question was this: OK, some people suffer because it leads them to God (of course, this would be unnecessary without sin, but that's another issue!), but Aquinas clearly asserts that God predestines people to hell. So then, how does you solution compute with that? People God predestines to hell aren't going to suffer in this life as a means to go to heaven. They're just going to suffer here and then suffer more in hell.
I found her response unusual. First she stated that there was no "predestination" in Aquinas because God is outside of time and therefore there's no "pre." Well, yes, everyone in orthodoxy Christianity agrees with this-especially those theologians who accept election. I don't see the point here. "Predestination" is more of an analogical human turn-of-phrase for God's action in eternity. The issue is: does God elect or not? And Aquinas pretty clearly states that he does.
The second thing she said was that God does not act upon the human will as an efficient cause, but only as a formal cause. To translate this for you Lutherans familiar with Luther in Bondage of the Will, God determines the human will through the "necessity of immutability" (i.e., God gives a new heart to human beings, which they freely act out of it by trust and loving him) and not by the "necessity of compulsion" (God does not somehow "manhandle" us from heaven into having faith). You can see my point here already: No one (and this includes Calvin and Augustine along with Luther) who teaches the doctrine of predestination believes that God acts on human being in salvation by a "necessity of compulsion." Therefore, when she denies this in response to the issue of predestination, she was either setting up a strawman argument (since no one holds the position that she was rejecting) or was somehow unaware of how the Augustinian tradition (within which Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin stand) understands divine and human agency.
Then she asserted what she considers to be Aquinas position: God offers grace to everyone. When God offers his grace, he removes the sinful inclination from the human will. This places the human will in a state of neutrality between good and evil. If the person in this state of neutrality at least does not resist God's grace, then God gives then sufficient divine grace to will the good and therefore converts them.
The difficulty is several fold: First, Thomas along with Luther, Calvin, and Augustine denies that the human will can in any sense be neutral. A will that is neutral is one that is empty of content, and something that is empty of content does not exist. In fact, one of the odder parts of her book on Aquinas is when she cites Aquinas saying precisely this and then proceeds to assert the opposite in the next paragraph. Even if she was correct about Aquinas, it would be an incoherent position. In a state of neutrality, there would be no will to allow itself to be brought in accordance with God's saving purpose, much less resist it. Secondly, because God gives human being the capacity to will the good, they do not trust and love God unfreely, rather they simply do what they want to do. If a good tree bears good fruit, then a good will does good things freely, not by compulsion. In the same way, an evil will does evil things out of its own nature. This is basic Augustinian stuff- it was all worked out in the Anti-Pelagian writings and set down in the Council of Orange. Hence predestination does no abrogate the human will or its freedom in the sense of imposing a form of compulsion on it. Luther only talks about the "slave will" because he is polemically contrasting his position with Erasmus' "free will." Nevertheless, what he means by "slave will" is merely the will determined by the necessity of immutability- which is what the Augustinian tradition has historically referred to as "free will"- i.e. having the ability to do what you want to do and not the ability to do "whatever."